Authors' abstract
Education in ethics among practising professionals should provide a systematic procedurefor resolving moral problems. A methodfor such decision-making is outlined using the two classical orientations in moral philosophy, teleology and deontology. Teleological views such as utilitarianism resolve moral dilemmas by cakulating the excess ofgood over harm expected to be produced by each feasible alternative for action. The deontological view focuses on rights, duties, and principles ofjustice. Both methods are used to resolve the 1971Johns Hopkins case of a baby born with Down's syndrome and duodenal atresia.
The past decade has seen a substantial increase in recognising the importance of moral factors in making decisions about patient illness. Along with this recognition has come an increased need for physicians to have a systematic method with which to think about and resolve moral problems in medicine. Several techniques have been developed, reviewed by Callahan (1) . However, nearly all of these techniques use the format of open-ended discussion of cases involving problematic moral issues. As such, they typically serve to expand the participants' thinking about moral issues, but they do not necessarily focus on making an actual decision. In this paper, we suggest a method which aims at providing a systematic series of questions an individual must ask in order to arrive at a well-reasoned moral decision. The method, which we will call the analytic approach, borrows certain concepts from traditional theories of ethics, and attempts to apply them systematically to making decisions about current ethical problems.
Traditional moral theories are neither procedures nor decision-making rules. Their chief task has been to explain and justify moral beliefs in order to develop consistency, plausibility, and completeness in our moral views. The needs ofexplanation and justification principles of explanation to be meaningful is a conscious ignoring of the peculiarities of each situation. However, while moral theories are meant to be fundamental and abstract, their principles might, at least, be used as conceptual aids in making moral decisions. This may move us part of the way down the decision-making path in a manner that is more comprehensive and well-reasoned than is opinion or intuition.
Broadly speaking, moral thought traditionally takes two general approaches to answering the basic question in normative ethics, 'What is the right thing to do?' The first approach, teleology usually defines 'right' in terms of the good produced as the consequences of an action. The most prominent form of teleology, utilitarianism, bids one calculate the probable results of performing various actions relevant to a situation and choose one that will maximise the ratio of benefit over harm produced. The second major approach, deontology, defines 'right' by considering intrinsic features of an action, largely independent of its consequences. We will draw on three main concerns of deontological theory here: 1) fulfilling one's duties in a situation, 2) respecting the rights and autonomy of others (regardless of the consequences), and 3) treating others with equal justice. These concerns are organised usefully in the logic of Kant's categorical imperative and principle of respect. Roughly these direct us to act only on rationales that we can generalise to similar situations and which can be consented to rationally by anyone similarly situated (or affected by such actions). Put another way, they advise us to respect everyone's capacity to determine and pursue her or his goals, never treating people as mere means or tools to our ends.
Despite their differences, both orientations are accepted by moral philosophers as worthy of serious consideration. Both strive to be logical, internally consistent, and to yield similar decisions in morally similar situations. Just as theories of natural science strive to explain the natural world by a set of interrelated logical principles, so ethical theories strive to explain the moral world by constructing their own principles. Step two, determining feasible alternatives, is greatly influenced by the presentation of claims. Within limits set by the environment, we can usually act in a way that satisfies the exclusive claims of either party or partially satisfies the claims of both. The purpose of moral decision-making is to determine which of the feasible alternatives is morally best. In the present case, the alternatives would seem to include performing surgery, allowing the baby to die (passive euthanasia), or actually ending the baby's life (active euthanasia).
Utilitarian approach At step three, utilitarian and deontological approaches diverge. Deontology determines the most moral action by setting forth the rights, duties, and principles involved in a situation and by trying to determine which take precedence. By contrast, utilitarian theory determines which actions will lead to the greatest ratio of benefit to harm for all persons involved in a dilemma. (This can be done for each act or by formulating a rule which, if followed regularly in similar situations, would be likely to maximise good.) In order to calculate the utilitarian ratio it is necessary to predict the possible outcomes (consequences) of each action, the probability ofeach outcome occurring, and the desirability of those outcomes for the child and for the parents and for society ( Table 1 , steps 3-6). The presentation of the utilitarian approach will rely heavily on the method outlined in Brody (3) .
Three possible outcomes are considered for each alternative action. These range from the best to the worst possible results measured in terms of the goal that a particular alternative was designed to achieve. The feasible alternatives, predicted outcomes and associated probabilities are the same from the perspective of both parents and child. They are presented in Table 2 , columns 1 and 2, and are repeated in Table 3 , columns 1 and 2. The outcomes from the perspective of society differ, as we shall see shortly. Similarly, the probability that each of the other outcomes listed in Table 2 There can be no resolution of this issue within the scope of this paper. Both arguments have merit. Some readers will undoubtedly favour the subjective approach, others will favour the objective one. What we wish to emphasise here is that no matter which solution is ultimately chosen, all persons at this point in the utilitarian calculation must address the question: 'value of behaviour to whom?' in assigning value to behaviour.
In order to demonstrate that the steps in the utilitarian process are the same regardless of which values are assigned we will go through the solution twice, first choosing values that stem from the subjective viewpoint, then choosing values stemming from the objective point of view. From the subjective viewpoint the value of life, as seen on behalf of a severely retarded child, will be immense. We may quantify this value judgement by giving the outcomes of living with either a normal, a 60 IQ, or a 40 IQ a weight of 1.0 on a scale ofzero to one ( Table 2 , column 3).
In comparison to the outcomes for surgery, the possible outcomes for euthanasia are much less desirable, when assessed on behalf of the child. Clearly, the worst outcome would be to die slowly and painfully. This outcome can be given a value of zero (Table 2 , passive euthanasia, column 4). In comparison, the prospect of dying slowly and with less pain is a slightly more palatable choice. Thus, our 'rational infant' may give it a valu( of .10. However, the prospect of a quick and pain-free death should be the least objectionable euthanasia outcome and may be valued even higher, say .30, by the child.
Based on the probabilities and values assumed in Table 2 , we are now able to calculate the total utilities for each feasible alternative. This is done by multiplying the value of each possible outcome by its associated probability and then sumnming across outcomes within each alternative. The resulting utilities are contained in the fifth column ofTable 2. As shown, performing the atresia operation is, from the child's subjective point ofview, ofmuch greater utility than either of the other two choices. Now let us shift ground for a moment and assume that a reasoner takes an 'objective' view of the value of life. In that case, the values assigned to the outcomes of living with an IQ of 60 or 40 will be much lower. Such values are listed under the 'alternative value' column in Table 2 . They reflect the fact that, objectively, the quality of life for a mentally disabled person is considerably less than for a person of normal intelligence. The utility of each outcome given the 'alternative value' is that value multiplied by the probability of the outcome occurring. The probabilities remain as they were in column 3. The new 'alternative utilities' are given in Table 2 , column 6.
The particular values a person chooses depend on his or her philosophical and religious beliefs and on his or her perception of the world. However, what binds together all persons who solve the dilemma in the spirit ofconsequentialism is that all will follow the same logic and all will have to wrestle with the same philosophical and factual problems.
Regardless of which set of utilities is accepted in Table 2 , the child's point of view is only one among several that should be considered. The situation can be handled statistically by considering the value of each outcome under the parents' perspective as the interaction of the value of that outcome to each parent alone. For example, we might estimate the value of rearing a child with an IQ of 60 to be .55 for each individual parent. The interaction would, therefore, be .55 (value to one parent) x .55 (value to other parent) = .30 (value from parents' perspective). It is this figure (.30) that appears as the value for the second outcome under surgery on Table 3 .
In practice, what we are suggesting is that instead of estimating the value to each parent individually the value from the parents' perspective be estimated directly. Where individuals act as a functional group it seems best to assign values in terms ofthat group. This technique will be especially helpful when we consider the effect of each alternative on society.
Returning to Table 3 , surgery, we see that while the prospect of having a child with an IQ of 60 is a lowly valued outcome (.30) the prospect of caring for a youngster with an IQ of 40 is valued even less. As for euthanasia alternatives, the outcome of dying quickly would seem to be valued about the same as that of dying slowly. While the former involves less pain to the child, the latter may be perceived by the parents as removing some of the responsibility for the baby's death from their shoulders. As before, the parents would place no value on the prospect of a painful death for their child. Notice that while the value weightings changed considerably from Tables 2  and 3 , the probability of active euthanasia leading to a quick death is much greater than it is for passive euthanasia. The most interesting outcome of the euthanasia alternatives is outcome 3, the possibility that the guidelines established by the present case may prove inadequate to distinguish between euthanasia that is in the patient's best interest from cases where it is not. One of the greatest public fears concerning euthanasia is that persons who may want to be saved will be allowed to die. This is another version of the 'slippery slope' argument. The purpose ofpresenting it here is to recognise the worst danger entailed by euthanasia and to estimate the probability of its occurrence as a consequence of either the passive or active euthanasia approaches. As can be seen in .00
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euthanasia are more desirable. The final step in the utilitarian approach is to combine the total utilities for each alternative as seen by the parents, by the child, and by society. Doing so (Table 5 ) reveals that, given the probabilities and original set ofvalues, surgery is the most useful option. This is due primarily to the clear advantage that the opportunity to live has for the child, even though it is recognised that the child will almost certainly be mentally disabled. In comparison, the disadvantages of surgery to the parents and to the society are not as great.
However, ifwe accept the alternative utilities shown in Table 5 , we arrive at a different conclusion. A comparison of these utilities indicates that euthanasia, particularly active euthanasia, is the preferred choice. The change between the two sets of utilities in Table 5 rests primarily on the value that the child himself would give to living with an IQ significantly below normal. If that value is high, then the surgery alternative has great utility (see child utility column). If it is not, then the surgery alternative becomes least attractive. A smaller but still significant change between the original and alternative utilities is the contribution made to the surgery alternative by the parents. If the parents find some value in rearing a original utilities) then the surgery alternative is more likely to be useful. If they do not (as in the alternative utilities) then the surgery alternative becomes less useful.
Deontological approach
Having considered a teleological approach to solving the dilemma, let us now turn to the perspective of deontology. As stated earlier, deontology denies what teleology asserts. That is to say, in the deontological perspective, the moral rightness ofan act is determined not by the consequences it produces, but by qualities intrinsic to the act itself. The particular qualities that we will consider here are the basic human rights and duties that impinge on a situation. We shall organise our thinking about the deontological approach around two questions: 'What rights are claimed, and by what principles are they valid?', and 'What duties are owed by whom and to whom?' (Table 1, steps 3 and 4) .
In answer to the first question, three rights-claims seem relevant to this situation: the child's claim to life, the parents' claim to liberty in their own lives, and the parents' claim to the freedom of being able to make decisions affecting their child.
We will look first at the child's claim of having a right to life. On what basis should we recognise this right? There is, of course, no simple answer. It is often argued that rights are associated with the status of personhood. But how is personhood defined? It seems reasonable to us that, since personhood is being used as a moral category here, to qualify as a person an individual must have the essential characteristics that distinguish us as a species capable of morality. These characteristics include the capacity to prefer one set of goods over another and the capacity to be treated and to treat others with respect or concern. Further, there must be a sense of self or at least a sense of being alive. Together, these characteristics constitute having 'a point of view'. To speak of a rights-claim presumes that ignoring that claim would cause a significant harm to, or loss or infringement of that individual's point of view.
It is difficult to determine whether a retarded neonate qualifies as a person by these criteria. Some of the difficulty is simply due to the child's status as a neonate. Are its faculties cognitively or subjectively complex enough to On the other hand, forcing the parents to keep and rear the baby when they have no special duty to do so would violate their rights. To determine if this is the case let us proceed with the third and fourth steps in the determination of duties.
The relevant duties seem to be from the parents and from society toward the child. (We will ignore the possibility, because it is slim, that the child has duties to commit suicide or seek foster care to avoid burdening its parents. After all, it did not bring itselfor its disabilities into existence or into its parents' lives.)
Considering the parents first, there is a generally recognised special duty ofparents to sustain the lives of their children. But does this duty extend to sustaining the life of a retarded neonate? The major argument for extending the duty is based on the fact that the parents brought the child into the world as a dependant. There are generally recognised practices in this culture pertinent to the nuclear family which many would argue include rearing retarded children. Assuming that the parents knew what these expectations were before the act of conception, they can now be held responsible for fulfilling them. Given this argument, those who also believe the child has a right to life may look to the parents to honour the right by authorising surgery.
Let us now consider the opposite argument, a case against extending the parents' special duty to cover this situation. Such an argument might contend that the special obligation of parents to care for their children holds only for such behaviour that can reasonably be expected to accompany parenthood. Since the parents could not reasonably have expected that their child would be born retarded, with accompanying duodenal atresia, they cannot be held fully responsible for sustaining its life. Persons holding this view may concede that the parents have a special obligation to do more for the retarded child than they would be expected to do for a normal child, including purchasing special equipment, providing a special education, and making an extreme effort to find a surrogate home for the child. But, according to this argument, they do not have an ultimate obligation to raise the child personally or to shoulder all the financial burden of having someone else raise the child. The second form of the parents' claim holds that regardless of the wisdom of their views, no other party has a greater right to determine the fate of their child than they do. Again, the claim rests on the special relationship of parent and child. But, in this case, the doctors also have a special relationship with the child, that of doctor and patient. The doctors, too, hold the child's interests in their trust. Thus, while the parents may be justified in asserting that their view should be equal to any other, a further case must be made to show that it is superior. Where the decisions of two parties, each having a special relationship to the child, differ, a third party who is specially equipped for deciding such issues, might be consulted. That party might consist of the courts or of an ethics committee. Of course, the function of that body should not be to decide the case in lieu of persons having special relationships with the child. Rather, it should adjudicate the arguments raised by the specially related persons.
Summary and conclusions
We have now pursued two approaches to moral decision-making and arrived at both decisions to perform and not to perform the atresia operation on the basis of each of them. In the case of the utilitarian approach, the difference in recommended actions hinged on differences in assigning values to the various alternatives. In the case of the deontological approach the difference hinged on the limits one sets on claims both to rights and to duties. Our goal has not been to convince the reader that one or the other action-choice is correct, but rather to suggest a way in which two broad sets of concerns (utility and justice) can be systematically considered in the course of making moral decisions. In doing so, we selected only certain tenets of each approach. We made simplifying assumptions and knowingly omitted certain content complications. However, we have tried to organise an individual's moral decision-making around certain ordered steps and questions that can readily be applied to solving problems in medical ethics.
The value of such an approach to students in general and to health professionals in particular seems to be three-fold. First, no decision reached through the systematic application of a valid ethical approach will be arbitrary. In the process of our reasoning, we have specified those perceptions of facts that must be made if a decision to perform or not to perform the operation is to be made. Thus, given the same value judgements and the same factual perceptions, all persons using a single ethical approach in a consistent manner should arrive at a similar moral decision in the case. Second, it encourages the health professional to adopt a logical, systematic approach to moral or social problems just as he or she would in solving professional (for example, medical or legal) ones. Third, the use of systematic thinking increases the chances that the decision the reasoner finally reaches will be both consistent with the reasoner's own values and in the best interests of the client.
An individual may not actually go through the process of constructing utilitarian tables or listing all claims, rights, and duties in every moral dilrmma. A simple list of pros and cons, and a consideration of one or two rights will probably suffice in most cases. But, having seen the process that underlies detailed ethical reasoning, the health professional is in a better position to guide her thought and to know which questions must be answered before she or he can rest comfortably with any moral decision.
